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oint ventures, particularly those involving
networks that contain many industry
J particinants. uresent some of the most
interesting and difficult antitrust issues.
Modern payment and electronic funds
transfer networks are technologies that
have greatly benefited consumers and the
economy by reducing transaction costs
and allowing consumers to economize
on their holdings of non-interest hearing
forms of money Payment networks,
however, may also be able to engage in
collective actions that allow their members
to exercise market power, and these net-
works have been involved in several signif-
icant antitrust disputes. Ifmembers of a
payment network exercise market po\ver,
the effects can he eouivalenr. to a privately
imposed sales tax on all network transac-
tions.’ Retail sales of aoods and services in
the United States total about 32 trillion per
year. A significant fraction of these sales
are made by merchants who accent credit
cards and other electronic forms of pay-
muent, so even a small tax on transactions
becatmse of market power can affect a large
volume of sales. And because networks
often exhibit significant scale econounies,
rival systems may not exist or may be
unable to constrain the dominant svstem~s
pricing significantly Economies of scale
can make it hard for a relatively small net-
work to coanpete and grow if the dominant
network is significantly larger.
It can he difficult to determine whether
a particular collective rule, or a particular
husiness combination between two com-
peting networks, creates net benefits or net
harms to consumers. Though antitrustinter-
vention with respect to a network~structure
or policies has the potential to generate
savings for society, it also carries potential
risks. Ill-founded antitrust intervention
can reduce or eliminate the benefits society
could otherwise enjoy from efficient network
muergers and practices and can deter other
networks from embarking on efficient
activities. Antitrust intervention should
therefore take place onlywhen the economic
effects of intervention are well understood
and there is clear evidence that the benefits
from intervention outweigh the harms.
It is sometimes stated that there are
two levels at which competition occurs
in payment networks: intrasystern compe-
tition occurs among members of a given
network. and inrcrsvstem competition occurs
among competing networks. Though this
dichotomy is useful for some purposes, it
has also led to confusion about the compet-
itive importance of particular network
rules and structures. Courts and commen-
tators sometimes have treated the number
of independent (and nonoverlapping) net-
works as the sole determinant of socierys
welfare. thouch we believe that the compet-
itive economics of navment networks are
far more complicated.
In this article we examine the concent
of network comupetition and the notion
that consumers of payment services can
always be best nrorecrecl through vigorous
efforts by courts and antitrtmst enforcers to
prevent the formation of overincltcsive net-
works. It is our view that one typically
cannot determine, on the basis of theoretical
considerations alone, whether permitting
access to payment networks by firms that
already provide payment services is, on
net, beneficial or harmful to consumers
or to society. Instead, we believe that a
careful analysis of the facts and economic
evidence concerning particular networks
and their policies is necessary to justify
antitrust interyention.
We explain later that in same
cases such a network might
even be able to impase this tax
an transactions that do not use
the network.




2 The authors and lexecan Inc.
were retained as experts an
behaf of Dean Witter in the liti-
gation. See SCFC IC Inn.
d/b/a Mountain WestFinancial
Cerpomtion v VISA liSA, Inc.,
819 Federal Supplement 956
(U.S. District Court, District of
Utah 1993), affirmed in part
and reversed in parf 936
Federal Reporter, 2nd Series
1096 (U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 10th Circuit, 1994);
certiorari denied, 115 Supreme
Court Reporter 2600 (1995).
This case has already spawned
o significant literature. See, e.g.,
Corlton & Frankel (1 995a,
1995b), Canton & Salop
(1995), Evans & Schmolensee
(1995), Hovenkamp (1995),
Balto (1993, 1995a, 19951),
and Baker (1993). This
section draws heavily an our
previous two articles.
Far example, Visa made it
difficult fnr same merchants
to accept the Discover Card
by refusing ta allow them to
process Discover Card tronsac
tians an the same merchant
terminals as Visa transactions.
In section 2 we describe our analysis
of Visa’s exclusion of Dean Witter, owner
of the Discover Card.2 The Dean Witter
case illustrates many of the issues that
arise in antitrust controversies involving
payment systems. First, we show that
despite assertions by Visa,an appellate
court, and some antitrust commentators,
intrasystem competition can be significantly
affected by a rule that denies membership
to a large-scale, price-cutting firm like
Dean Witter. even when there are already
thousands of members in the network.
This analysis refutes the notion that society~
welfare depends entirely on the numberof
independent networks in the market.
Second,we examine Visa’s purported justi-
fications for its exclusionary policy and
show that the evidence does not support
their justifications. Third, we explain why
maximizing the number of competing net-
works does not necessarily lead to the
greatest possible consumer benefits. ‘We
explain how network rules (and merchants’
transaction costs) affect the prices
consumers pay for credit card services and
for the goods and services they purchase
from merchants that accept credit cards. We
show that Dean Witter’s membership in
Visa was unlikely to have any significant
harmful effects on intersystem competition
and its exclusion by Visa is instead likely
to retard the introduction of new competing
networks. We conclude that in this case
Dean Witter meets our high standard for
antitrust intervention.
In section 3 we explain why the
arguments raised by other symposium
participants regarding the alleged harmful
effects ofATM network mergers fall far
short of our standard for supporting
antitrust intervention. Though these
participants condemn virtually all network
mergers because they eliminate competition
between competing networks, we show
that mandating their version of intersystem
competition through antitrust enforcement
is not a competitive panacea and in factis
likely to harm society We analyze the
effects of an ATM network merger in
Chicago to illustrate our point. Finally
section 4 presents a brief conclusion.
NETWORK COMPEUTN4ON,
W CREDiT cAR.D SYSTEMS:
THE DEAN WITTED, VISA
CESE
The confusion from equating society’s
welfare with the numher of independent
networks is evident in various discussions
of the recent litigation between DeanWitter
and Visa, The case involves an attempt by
Dean Witter to overturn a Visa rule
preventing Dean Witter from becoming a
Visa member because Dean ‘Witter also
issues a competing credit card brand,
the Discover Card.
Visa is a network joint venture
comprising thousands of financial
institutions that issue the Visa card, a
general-purpose credit card, Visa members
compete with each other and independently
set annual fees, interest rates and other
terms of their credit card programs. Dean
Witter’s Discover Card is also a general-
purpose credit card, but it is issued on a
proprietary basis by Dean Witter alone,
Visa viewed the Discover Card,introduced
in the mid-I980s, as a significant threat
and undertook efforts to make it less sue-
cessfuI.~Despite those efforts, however,
Dean Witter persisted, and the Discover
Card became successful. Then in 1989,
Dean Witter applied forVisa membership.
At the time Dean Witter introduced
the Discover Card, Visa and MasterCard
(like Visa, a bank credit cardjoint venture,
the membership of which largely overlaps
Visas) had policies of admitting as members
any financial institutions that qualified for
federal deposit insurance, The Dean Witter
subsidiary that issued the Discover Card
met this criterion. Indeed, at the time Dean
Witter introduced the Discover Card, it
had an affiliate that was already a member
of Visa,but it subsequently allowed that
membership to lapse. Visa tried to induce
Dean Witter to convert its Discover Card
into a Visa card, but Dean Witter declined.
Subsequently Visa denied DeanWitter’s
application for admission and passed a new
rule prohibiting affiliatesof DeanWitter,
American Express, or any firm with a card
brand deemed competitive by the Visa
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board from becoming Visa muemubers. Visa
pointedly did not deem competitive either
MasterCard, despite the fact thatmost banks
that issue the Visa card are also MasterCard
issuers, or the proprietary cards Diners
Club and Carte Blanche, which are issued
by Citibank, Visa’s largest member.
In 1990, Dean Witter acquired the
assets of a Utah financial institution that
was already a Visa member. When Visa
learned of Dean Witter’s plan to use this
financial institution to issue millions of
additional Visa cards, it blocked the issuance
of those cards and litigation ensued. Dean
Witter claimed that its exclusion from Visa
caused antitrust injury because its Visa
program would have benefited consumers
directly by delivering low-priced credit cards
to them and by causing a general increase
in competition. (At the time that Dean
Witter had planned to launch its Prime
Option Visa card, it would have been the
only major issuer of no-fee Visa cards or
MasterCard cards; AT&T’s no-fee offer had
just expired, and Visa’s largest members
still maintained annual fees on most of
their accounts.) Dean Witter also claimed
that Visa’s actions had the intent and effect
of restricting competition in the market for
credit card services by reducing the likeli-
hood that Visa members would create their
own proprietary credit cardbrands to com-
pete with Visa. Visa’s actions indicate that
a Visa member would risk expulsion if it
was successful in issuing a card outside
the Visa system.
Visa raised four main defenses to
Dean Witter’s legal challenge. First, Visa
claimed that it was impossible for it to
exercise market power because it did not
control the terms of credit card plans
offered by Visa’s thousands of individual
members. Visa asserted therefore that the
entry of one more mnemher, DeanWitter,
could nor possibly benefit consumers.
Hence exclusion of that firm could nor
possibly harm consumers. Second, Visa
claimed that admitting Dean Witter into
Visa actually would harm consumers by
reducing intersystem competition between
Discover Card and Visa. Third, Visa argued
that even ifDean ‘Witter’s membership in
Visa would benefit consumers, Dean Witter
would be free-riding on Visa. For example,
Visa claimed that Dean Witter would be
able to obtain confidential Visa information
to use in promoting its Discover Card. Visa
also argued that it was entitled to any profits
it could earn by excluding Dean Witter or
anyone else, even if consumers were harmed
as a result, because to force it to do other-
wise would be an infringement of Visa’s
property rights.
A district court jury found in favor of
Dean Witter. In reversing this jmy decision,
the Tenth Circuit found, among other con-
clusions, that as a matter of law Visa lacked
market power, even though its members
collectively accounted for a large share of
the market, because its individual members
had small market shares. Therefore, it rea-
soned, Visa could not have exercised
market power by excluding Dean Witter,
We examine each of Visa’s main argument.s
in more detail and explain why we found
that the evidence supports Dean Witter.
A, Single New Visa Cardissuer Like
Dean Wiite-r Can Benefit Cansun’rers
Visa’s first argument was that, because
it already had thousands of issuers and did
not set the terms of the card plans offered
by those members, it could not keep prices
higher and exercise marketpower by excluding
any one potential member. As a logical
matter, this argument is wrong. Exclusion
of an unusually efficient firm can indeed
adversely affect competition. Moreover, this
argument was directly contradicted by evi-
dence that Visa and its members expected
that entry by a large-scale, low-price firns
like Dean Witterwould havedepressed prices
and profits significantly Visa members had
good reason to think so. In March 1990,
one yearbefore Dean Witter had planned
to launch its Visa card, AT&T rocked the
banking industry by launching a massive
bank credit card program. Whereas the
top credit card issuers generally charged a
520 annual fee on their accounts, AT&T
offered consumers a credit cardJreejor lrfe
if they accepted during the program’s first
year and used the card at least once a year.
‘The U.S. Supreme Caurt
declined to review the Tenth
Circuit’s decision.
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~ high interest rates and usury laws caused
credmt card mssuers to mncur stgnmltcant
losses, is now much less common.
In an earlier article we cited this AT&T
effect as evidence that a large price-cutting
AT&T GM entrant could generate significantbenefits
to consumers.6 Figure 1 shows the trend
12 ~ ‘ in average credit card annual fees from
II .. . , -, 1984 to I994.~Figure 2 shows the annual
lB ,“ fee series in constant 1992 dollars. Iris
9 ~‘fi~ apparent from the figures that AT&T’s
8 entry caused not an immediate drop in
7 fees, hut instead an acceleration in the
6 ‘ rate at svhich they were declining. It took
timeforAT&Ttoenrollitsmillionsof
1984 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 1994 cardholders. It also took time for competi-
tors to feelthe effects of AT&T’s entry and
E’fliI$IIIIlIIIUIIitIUIIIktUPJU ~
up for renewal after obtaining AT&T’s card
or hearing of its offer. As banks reacted
with no-fee or low-fee card programs of
their own, additional banks decided to
drop their annual fees and some banks that
initially dropped fees only for the first
year decided later to make the no-fee
feature permanent.
We estimate the following annual fee
regression equations:
Average Annual Fee Charged by
Visa Issuers
















See Curltan and Fronkel
(1995a, 1 995b) for discus-
sions of trade press accounts of
AT&T’s entry into and effect an
the morket.
6 Cnrltan and Frankel (1995o).




annual fee series in 1992. We
updated their series thraugh
late 1994.
1984 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 1994
Industry observers say the effect of
AT&T on the credit card market was pro-
found.5 Hundreds of other banks began
reducing or waiving their annual fees, and
many industry participants and analysts
credited AT&T with igniting a price war.
Visa adopted rule changes to make more
difficult a repeat of AT&T’s program, and
several banks tried to persuade various
regulators that AT&T’s program should be
shut down because of alleged legal
violations. Dean Witter tried to follow
AT&T one year later, and General Motors
did launch a major no-fee card of its own
in late 1992. Others have since followed,
and the annual fee, which became prevalent
in the early I980s when credit controls,
(1) Log(RFee) =
+~,(T>Kr&TEntry)
+ ‘)i (Quarter Dummies) +~
(2) Log(RFee) = a +/3uT
+p,(T>AT&T Entry)
+~3(T>GMEntry)








where REee is the average annual fee
in constant 1992 dollars, T is a measure
of time, and (T>AT&T Entry) and
(T>GM Entry) are zero before the respec-
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a is set equal to zero in
1990:1, and rises by incre-
ments of 0.25 per quarter.
In the linear specificatians there
is no staisflcally significant
change in the level of fees at
the flme of entry. In lquaton 1,
(with an AT&’f but no GM
effect), there appears to be
slight upward shift in fees for
the first three quarters, after
which the net effect is negative
and stuhsticolly significant.
Because it may take time far
consumers ta switch issuers,
we da not empect on immediate
ance’and’fonall downward shift
in fees and instead impose the
constraint that the overage fee
is confinuous with respect to
time. This constraint has only a
minor effect on the other caeffi~
cleats.
~Regression specifications car~
recting for serial correlation
generally confirm the findings
reported in table 1. Evans and
Schmalensee claim that annual
fees were declining in inflation’
adjusted terms even before
AT&T entered, and a regression
analysis shows no incremental
effect of AT&T’s entry on the
level of fees. Their analysis,
however, suffers from at least
two serious defects. First,
Evans ond Schmalensee test for
a once-andtor-all, immediate
shift downward in fees ot the
time of AT&T’s entry, after
which they impose the con
straint that fees continue to
decline at the old rate. As our
analysis shows, it is important
to allow for a change in the
rate of decline of annual fees to
identify on effect. Second,
they omit half ofthe post’AT&T
data from their analysis.
‘‘The quarterly Federal Reserve
data ore published in the
monthly Federal Reserve bul-
letins and in electronic form
and are reprinted in the oppen-
dim to this article.
‘~ Regressions correcting for serial
correlation ond regressions
allowing far effects operating





Summary of Effects of AT&T and GM on Average Real Annual Fee
Charged by Visa Issuers
Log of Average Average
Visa Annual Fee Visa Annual Fee
Dependent Variable: (in 1992 Dollars) (In 1992 Dollars)
Equation I Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
[I~ Years after AT&T’s
Entry (Zero beforeAT&T —6104 —0031 —0.767 4.286
enters,arelapsecltirnein (6013) (0015) (0154) (0.215)
year after AT&T enters)
f3~YeorsAfter GM’s
Entry (Zero Before GM —0181 —1.219
enters, orelapsed timein (0028) (0415)
years after GM enters)
0 941 0373 0.945 0956
Indicatessignificant at 95 percentconfidence level Standard errors in parentheses.
tive entry dates of those firms and equal using various consumer interest rate
to the amount of time (in years) that has series published by the Federal Resen’e.”
elapsed since their entry rhereafter.~The The coefficients on the interactionbetween
regression equations implicitly restrict the AT&T dummy and the other interest
average annual fees to be continuous at rate series (that is, AT&T X other interest
the date of AT&T and GM’s entry’ Quar- rate) is generally positive and statistically
terly dummy variables account for significant, indicating that credit card
seasonal effects. rates became more responsive to movements
Table I summarizes the AT&T and in other marker interest rates after AT&T’s
GM effects we estimate for these specifica- entry The results also indicate that
tions. The results are quite clear. The the overall level of credit card interest
decline in average Visa annual fees acceler- rates (that is, the coefficient on the AT&T
ated significantly after AT&T entered. dummy plus the coefficient on the AT&T
Figures 1 and 2 and i’able 1 also show >< other interest rate interaction variable
another important phecmomnenon. When multiplied by the actual other interest
GM, a second aggressive no-fee entrant, rate) fell slightly in the period following
introduced its programu 2’!, yearsafter AT&T, AT&T’s entry though this effect is not
the decline in annual fees accelerated fur- statistically significant.”
ther. This result supports our contention Within three years of AT&T’s industry
that Dean \Vitter, which would have entered shake-up. average annual fees had fallen
1 ‘/2 years before GM. would have generated by 27 percent, and after 4½ years, annual
significant benefits to consumers.” fees had fallen by 53 percent. Credit card
We also conduct a preliminary analysis interest rates became more responsive to
of credit card interest rates (which some changes in other interestrates. We believe
commentators have suggested are unusually that AT&T and other entrants like GM
unresponsive to movemnents in other market had such significant effects, despite the
interest rates) and find evidence that credit existence of mammy other issuers, because
card interest rates were also affected by they used novel marketing programs that
AT&T’s entry Table 2 reports the results included zero annual fees, rebates and




Effect of AT&T’s Entry on Credit Card Interest Rates
DependentVariable: Credit Card Plan Rate Log (Credit Card Rate)
Equation I Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
Intercept 14.860 13.702 12199 2 448 2.2 19 2.011
(0.541) (0.892) (1039) (0.073) (0144) (0160)
AT&T —1681 —2 979 —5.569 —0162 —0402 4.836









Personal Loan Rate 0396
(0068)




AT&Tx Lag (New Car Elate) 0071
‘‘Ausubel (1995) claims that (0036)
overoll credit cord issuer profits Log (Used Car Rote) 0246
remained high in the period (0052)
after AT&T’s entry. Regardless AT&Tx Log (Used Car Rate) 0149
of whether one accepts this, (0071)
industry pricing certainly was Log (Personal Loan Rate) 0327
dramancolly changed by AT&T s 059
envy. (Even if Ausubel’s claim
is true, it is possible that profits AT&Tx Log
would have been higher if AT&T (Personal Loon Rate) 0308
had not entered the credit cord (0.081)
market.) Annual fees fell, R2 0.858 0780 0852 0.873 0.774 0.856
interest rates become more .
res onsive and accardin to Donates coefficient is signrfcani at the 95 percent level. Standard errars in parentheses.
p g Monthly Interest rates are taken from Baard af Governors of the Federal Reserve, FederalReserve Bulletin. Ausubel, miscellaneous fees
increased—facts inconsistent
with Visa’s position thot addi~
tiorral Vrsa members, such os and rapid achievement ofscale economies competitive benefits.’’ Had Dean \Vitrer
AT&1 GM, or Dean Witter, (AT&T became the second largest Visa been permitted to issue no-fee Visa cards
should hove no effect on what issuer within two years). in early 1991, consumers would have been
Vrsa claims is already a hrghly We conclude based on statistical significantly better off because they wotmld
competitive market. In fact, . . .
~ th analysis that confirms mndustry opmnton, have enjoyed the benefits of lower credut
creditcordprofitsniaybe ° that when AT&T entered the credit card card prices faster. Our conservative
declining. See “Competition muarket, somnething mmportant happened estmmate ms that consumers would have
and Empenses Put the Squeeze that benefited many consumers significantly saved more than $1 billion in annual fees
on Profits,” Credit Card News, Analysis also shows that the next large had Dean \Vitter been allowed to issue
April 1,1995, p.]. entrant (GM) generated significant Visa cards.
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Visa’s Free-Riding Justifications Are
Unsupportable
Visa claimed that it was necessary to
exclude Dean \Vitter because otherwise
Dean Witaier would be able to free-ride on
Visa. Visa identified two types of free-riding.
The first involved outright Dean Witter
appropriation of confidential Visa informa-
tion, with which Discover Card could gain
an unfair competitive advantage. The
second claim was that Dean Witter would
he free-riding on the investments made by
founding members of the Visajoint
venture and that Visa should not, under
the antitrust laws, be forced to share its
property with a competitor. Neither of
these free-riding allegations is correct.
Visa has thousands of card-issuing
members, most of which also issue
MasterCard cards. Visa’s largest member,
Citibank,not only issues MasterCard
cards, it also issues two proprietary card
brands, Diners Club and Carte Blanche.
Dean Witter itseLf had an affiliate that was
a Visa member at the time it introduced
the Discover Card. There is simply no
evidence that these members have ever
misappropriated valuable Visa information,
and there is no basis to believe that misap-
propriation would be a problem for Dean
Witter. There are few important secrets
that are disseminated to 6,000 members
and remain secret, and those that are, such
as information conveyed in the approval
of individual transactions, are protected
by contract. So inconsequential is this
concern of misappropriation that Citibank
not only is allowed to serve on Visa’s board
ofdirectors, hut also was forseveral years
guaranteed representation—despite its
ownership of competing card brands.
There is no reason to believe, nor did
Visa argue, that misappropriation should
he a greater concern for Dean Witter
than anyone else.
Visa also alleged that DeanWitter’s
entry would allow it to free-ride on the
investments made by its founding members,
an investment on which Visa members were
entitled to receive a return and should not
be forced to share. According to Visa,such
forced sharing of property would have
eroded the incentive for Visa to form and
develop. However, most ofVisa’s thousands
of memnbers, including six of its largest 10
issuers, joined the network many years
after Visa was formed. Even today Visa
maintains an open membership policy as
long as the applicant does not issue any
brands deemed competitive by the Visa
board. This openness presumably demon-
strates the lack of any inefficiencies from
allowing newmembers and likely reflects
the efficiencies Visa realizes from expanding
the size of the network. Indeed, Visa’sjusti-
fication for excluding DeanWitter to protect
investment returns of earlier members has
nothing whatsoever to do with the fact
that Dean Winter happens to issue a corn-
peting card brand. Every new Visa member
shares Visa’s property in exactly the same
way that Dean Witter would have if it had
been allowed to issue Visa cards. Iftaken
seriously Visa’s argumentwould allow it to
expel any firm selectively on the basis that
it was not afounder and competed too vig-
orously with lower prices or better service.
Though it is important to protect property
rights, the antitrust laws do not grant joint
ventures the unlimited property right to
profits achieved through a collective exer-
cise of market power.m4 Visa’s past behavior
in granting applications for membership
reveals that its exclusion of DeanWitter
cannot bejustified on an argument that its
entry will erode the property rights that
were necessary to create the incentives to
form and develop Visa.
Vlsa~rRule Threatens lniersystern
Cornpetition, But Dears WitleVi-
Mew ~-~w’o ;-‘ ~‘saDae~ Na’
One check on the exercise of collective
market power by members of a joint ven-
ture is freedom of its individual members
to offer proprietary products and services
outside the operation of the jointventure
in competition with the joint venture’s
product. Paymnent systems are no exception.
Though proprietary payment systems may
he unable to realize the scale economies of
the largejoint ventures, they tnay at least
lJ~~ issue of preserving the
profit incentive of joint ventures
to invest, though easy to deal
with in the Dean Witter case, is
in general o difficult problem.
See Carlton and Fronkel
(l995a, 1995b).
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Visa operates as a nonprofit
joint venture in which members
have voting power to elect
board members according to
their volume of credit card
transactions.
provide some constraints on prices. Visa’s
rule, which is likely to preclude any current
or prospective Visa member from issuing
any new proprietary card brands, eliminates
or drastically reduces the threat of future
competing proprietary cards like the
Discover Card. Few if any firms would
risk expulsion or exclusion from Visa to
issue a proprietary card that competes with
Visa. Visa’s rule makes it less likely that
Dean Witter’s Novus network, on which it
processes Discover Card transactions and
can process other proprietary card transac-
tions, will become an effective competitor
of Visa and MasterCard in attracting the
participation of other institutions because
the most likely prospective participants are
already members of Visa and would there-
fore be reluctant to issue a proprietary card.
So how would Dean Witter’s entry into
Visa threaten intersystem competition? Visa
and its supporters argued that Dean Witter’s
membership in Visa would havebeen
harmful to consumers because, though
there are thousands of Visa issuers, there
are only a fewnetworks. They alleged that
Dean Witter’s membership in Visa is like a
merger between the two, so therewould
have been even fewer networks competing
independently Visa claimed that Dean
Witter would compete less vigorously once
it be came a Visa member. But these claims
do not withstand careful analysis.
Dean Witter’s membership in Visawould
not havebeen at all Like a merger between
the two. Dean Witter would still have
exclusive control and ownership of its pro-
prietary network and would obtain only a
small share of voting rights in Visa.°7
Would Dean Witter have competed
less vigorously once it was a Visa member?
Visa’s members thought the opposite was
true, which is perhaps why they didn’t
want Dean Wittier to become a member.
Visa’s own studies concluded that a large
entrant within Visa would be a more effec-
tive competitor and put greater pressure on
the prices and profits of incumbents than
an entrant that had only a proprietary
card program. Visa claimed that Dean
Witter would have an unfair competitive
advantage over other Visa members if it
could issue both the Discover Card and
Visa cards. This may have concerned
Visa’s incumbents, hut it should not
by itself have been a concern of the
antitrust laws.
Some commentators have alleged that
Dean Witter would have competed less vig-
orously for merchant accounts if it became
a member of Visa and that this would have
allowed Visa to raise its interchange fees.
Interchange fees in the credit card networks
are paid by the bank servicing the merchant
to the bank servicing the cardholder in
transactions involving two different banks.
These fees are set by the collective action
of Visa banks. Discover Card has no inter-
change fees because its transactions always
involve a single financial institution. But
Discover Card, like Visa members, negoti-
ates discount rates with merchants. The
merchant receivesnot the total face amount
of a credit card transaction, but only the
net amount after deduction of the merchant
discount. Visa merchant banks must pay
the interchange fee out of the proceeds
from the merchant discount. Therefore
Visa members have an incentive to reduce
their merchant discount rates as Visa
reduces the interchange fee.
Visa’s supporters argued that if Dean
Witterbecame aVisa member, it would
increase its merchant discount rate on
Discover Card transactions to enable Visa to
raise its interchange fee, (and consequently
to allow Visa members to raise their
discount rates). However, there is a flaw
in this analysis. It assumes that Dean
Witter’s introduction of the Discover Card
has caused Visa to keep interchange fees
significantly lower than itwould have oth-
erwise. There is no evidence to support
this assumption. Itis true that Discover
Card was introduced with lower merchant
discount rates than were typically charged
by Visa members. That was because
Discover Cards were carried and used by
relatively fewconsumers and merchants
were unwilling to pay much for a Discover
Card transaction, since they would lose
few transactions if they declined to accept
it. But Discover Card’s lower discount rate
would cause Visa to reduce its interchange
FRDFBAL RESERVS BANK OF ST. Louis
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fee only ifsignificant numbers ofmerchants
began to decline acceptance of Visa cards
and Visa members could not reduce their
merchant discountrates inresponsebecause
the interchange fee was too high. This has
not happened and is unlikely to happen.
There are simply too many consumers using
Visa cards for most merchants to be willing
to acceptonly Discover Card (or, as explained
later, induce consumers to use a Discover
Card instead of a Visa card). This greatly
attenuates the effect of intersysnem compe-
tition on merchant fees.
There is another reason why Visa
has not had to reduce its interchange
fees in response to Discover Card. Most
merchants do not distinguish their cash
prices from their creditprices, andvirtually
no merchants charge different prices for
different credit cards. There are several
reasons to explain this behavior. First,
many states ban surcharges on credit card
transactions. Therefore while a discount
for cash can be offered, this ban necessarily
constrains all credit card transactions to
occur at the same price. Second, credit
card systems generally have contractual
restrictions on merchants that prohibit
merchants from doing anything—particu-
larly with respect to price—at the point
of sale to discourage the use of their brands
in favor of others. Third, even where mer-
chants are free to charge different prices
for cash and credit, they usually do not.
This implies that transaction costs permit
at least some differences in transaction
costs between different payment methods
to persist and not be passed on to
consumers at the point of sale. As a
result, even when permitted, merchants
generally do not offer inducements to
consumers to use a particular brand of
credit card even if its merchant discount
rate is lower. Therefore once a credit
card brand is accepted by a merchant,
that brand gains no incremental sales by
reducing its merchant discount rate. For
all these reasons, Discover Card’s mer-
chant discount rate has little effect on
the comparable rate for Visa.
In our earlier article we explained
that we have neither performed nor seen
relevant studies that determine whether
interchange fees are, on net, a procompeti-
tive or anticompetitive practice compared
with an at-par settlement system like that
used for checks. Because merchants usually
do not charge different prices for cash and
credit, one effect of interchange fees is to
raise the price to cash customers. (The
merchant must raise the single price
charged to recover the merchant discount,
much of which reflects the interchange
fee.) If credit card interchange fees are
on balance harmful to consumers, then
keeping Dean Witter out of Visa does little
or nothing to solve that problem for the
reasons explained previously Moreover, if
interchange fees somehow generate
antitrust harm and excess profits, then
antitrust policy should encourage card
issuers’ efforts, like those of Dean Witter,
to rebate those profits to consumers, whether
explicitly with cash or in-kind rebates, or
implicitly with low prices for credit card
services. In any event, antitrust policy
should probably encourage the relaxation
of restrictions on merchants’ abilities to
influence the choice of payment method
at the point of sale.
In its argument, Visa stressed that
Dean Witter doesn’t need Visa to compete
in the relevant market, so Visa should not
have to admit Dean Witter. According to
Visa, as long as a firm like Dean Witter can
survive in the market on its own, it should
have no recourse under the antitrust laws
to demand entry into the dominant network.
However, consumers can still be harmed
even if a firm excluded from a dominant
network can still survive. If Visa’s reasoning
were accepted, a dominant ATM network,
for example, could expel banks that charged
low fees, even if the only motive for and
effect of the expulsion was an increase in
market prices and profits of the remaining
banks. Such expulsions would he immune
from antitrust challenge under Visa’s stan-
dard because the expelled banks could still
compete by offering their own customers
access to proprietary ATM terminals.
Our analysis of the Dean WitterlVisa
case demonstrates why cases cannot be
decided simply by comparing the number
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‘6See kasmusen et ol. (1991).
17ln close cases, we likely would
favor nonintervention. See
Carlton and Fmnkel (1995o,
l995b).
~Duality means that a firm par’
ticipoting in one network is per-
mined to participate also in
another competing network.
of network members on the one hand with
the number of networks on the other. The
issues are far too complicated to settle on
such simple grounds. We have shown
through a careful analysis of the competi-
tive effects resulting from Visa’s exclusion
of Dean Witter that mandating access to an
intersystem competitor can sometimes be a
sensible antitrust policy We were able to
reach this conclusion because Visa’s
efficiencyjustifications are meritless. In
such a situation, Visa’s exclusion of Dean
Witter is a naked exclusion, one whose sole
effect is to harm consumers.’6
We are generally reluctant to
recommend intervention in the operation
or rules of a joint venture because we
are concerned with the inefficiencies
caused by interferingin an efficiently
operating joint venture. When a rule
like the Visa rule that excludes Dean
Witter causes anticompetitive harm to
consumers and has no offsetting efficiency
benefit, however, such intervention is
appropriate. If, on the other hand, there
were significant legitimate efficiency
considerations of roughly the same magni-
tude as the procompetitive benefit frotn
Dean Witter’s entry into Visa, we likely
would have been unable to support
Dean Witter’s position.”
INTERSYSTEM COMPETN
UON, fN ATM NETWORKS
Our standard for supporting antitrust
intervention in joint ventures is that the
gain to society from intervention clearly
exceeds the harm, taking into account all
legitimate efficiencies—with the benefit
ofthe doubt going to the joint venture in
close cases. This standard generally can
be met only by a careful analysis of the
factsand evidence of a particular case.
Our standard stands in sharp contrast to
that offered by other participants in this
symposium. David Balto and Donald
Baker lament the decline of intersystem
competition in payment systems and con-
demn virtually all network mergers and
networkduality1’ The focus of their
discussion is ATM network consolidation,
which they blame on antitrust enforcement
that has, they say for many years been far
too lax. They claim that regulators followed
a policy of favoring network mergers to
achieve efficiencies of ubiquity and imply
that that policy was misguided because
those efficiencies pale in comparison with
those that could have resulted from main-
taining internetwork competition.
Balto and Baker would recommend
unwinding many ATM network mergers
because they think consumers have been
greatly harmed. If that is the case, there
should be by now (after many such
mergers have occurred) plenty of evidence
of that harm. However, they present little
such evidence. They cite a few examples
of ATM network mergers in which they
claim that incentive discount membership
programs were eliminated following a
merger, but they present no evidence of
aggregate consumer benefit or harm, or
even of systematic increases in fees to
consumers following mergers. Moreover,
even if consumer prices did go up following
mergers (and we are unaware of systematic
evidence to that effect), consumers might
still be better off as a result of the increased
network size and geographic density As
the number of participants and terminals
on the network increases, consumers can
rely more on the network. Thefull cost of
using ATM services, including search costs
and the risk ofbeing unable to find an
operating terminal, might have fallen even
if some fees increased. More relevant than
price is quantity Ifquantity rises as a result
of a merger, that is evidence suggesting that
consumers have benefited.
To illustrate how one might approach
a systematic analysis of the competitive
effects ofATM networkmergers, we examine
the results of a network merger between
the only two regional shared ATM networks
in Chicago, Cash Station and Money Net-
work. Before 1987 these two networks
competed with each other, hut in late 1986
they agreed to merge. Following a transi-
tion that lasted more than a year, all
consumers could use all ATM terminals
belonging to members of the now-combined
network in early 1988.
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Effects of Merger Between Cash Station and Money Network
Cask Station/MoneyNetwork Total United States
Number of Network
Number of tntorliank Operating Cost Number of ATM
Terminals in Transactions ~fl Per Transaction Number of ATM Transactions in
Network millions in cents Terminals millions
(Cunolatove lCrnnolotive (Coroolalive tComalaiiv (Coronklive
Year poraodago Sngop percentage thong P percentage chongel percininge thongel percentage thange)
1967 850 34.7 22.51 68,000 4,108
1986 1,042 448 10 921 72,500 4581
226) (291) (515) (-‘-6.6) (115)
1989 1,335 60.3 9791 75,600 5274
+57.1) (738) (—565) (11.2 (+284)
1990 2,089 722 7 591 80200 5,942
(1458) t 1081 (—663) (179) +446
1991 2,256 830 7121 83,500 6,642
(165.4 1392) —68.4) (228) 617)
1992 Z398 79? 7141 87,300 7537
(1821) +1303) 683 28.4) +835)
1993 2817 80.1 706 9&800 8135
2314) (1308) (686) 39i4 ( 980)
1994 3422 84.6 7791 109080 8,958
3026 (+144 4) (—65.4) (604) (1181)
1995 3,550 890 7.611
(3176) (+1565 —653)
Sources: U.S. data are from Faulkner & Gray, Bank Network News, reprinted in the StatisticalAbstractof the UnitedStates (1994),
Table Ho. 801; and Bank NetowrkNews P995 ETF Network Data Book (ash Station data were provided by Cash Station, Inc. We
thank James Hayes of Cash Station far his helpful cooperation and comments.
I-low were consumers affected by this
merger? Balto and Baker would probably
have condemned it outright and would
have favored antitrust intervention to pre-
vent it. After all, theywould reason, the
market supported two networks before, so
two networks can clearly survive in this
market. Why lose the benefits of competi-
tion between the networks? However, this
simple argument is insufficient to justify
antitrust intervention. As Table 3 shows,
output by any measure soared following
rhe merger. In 1987, when the networks
had already begun to merge, there were
850 ATM ternninals in the network, and
the combined networks processed 34.7
nuillion interbank transactions at an
average network operating cost of 50.225
per transaction. By 1990 the number of
terminals had increased by 146 percent
(compared with an increase of 18 percenn
for the United States as a whole), the
number of transactions had increased by
108 percent (compared with 45 percent
for the United States), and the network’s
average cost per transaction had fallen by
66 percent. This huge growth in network
participation and tnsage occurred despite
the imposition by many banks, for the first
time, of foreign fees on their customers
when they use ATM terminals owned by
other banks. In 1991 the merged network
increased its interchange fee, the fee paid
by a card-issuing hank to the hank that
owns the terminal used by its customers.
The interchange fee influences the issuers’
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decision to Ievyjoreign fees, but can also
affect the incentive banks have to deploy
terminals. In fact, the number of terminals
in the network has grown faster than in
the United States as a whole, and transac-
tion volume exceeds the level that existed
before the increase of the interchange fee.
These results suggest that the Cash
Station/N oney Network merger was
procompetitive and benefited consumers.
It demonstrates the risks associated with
basing antitrust enforcement on a simple
tally of the number of independent
networks and suggests that preventing
network mergers and instead relying on
internetwork competition to generate
consumer benefits in payment networks
may entail too great a cost in foregone effi-
ciencies from network consolidation.
CONCLUSION
The goal of antitrust legislation is to
maximize the benefits society obtains from
competition. Payment system networks
that are formed asjoint ventures by
competing financial institutions, like other
types ofjoint ventures, present difficult
antitrust issues because competing firms
must cooperate to provide service. Some
commentators have argued that the way
to resolve these difficult issues is to use
antitrust intervention to ensure that mul-
tiple payment networks remain separate
and compete with one another. We have
shown that this simple policy recommen-
dation is inadequate. Instead, a thorough
analysis of the competitive effects of an)’
proposed antitrust intervention in these
networks must be done before such inter-
vention can he justified on the grounds
of increasing society’s welfare.
We showed how; in the Dean Witter/Visa
case, one can perform such an analysis and
support intervention when, as in that case,
the evidence shows that the consumer
benefit from intervention clearly exceeds
the harm. We also showed, using an
ATM—networknuerger as an example, that
antitrust intervention based only on the
number of networks can be misguided.
The pursuit of competing and completely
nonoverlapping networks should not be
the driving force of antitrust policy toward
payment networks. In many cases society
is likely to benefit from mergers of
competing payment networks and is also
likely to benefit from antitrust action that
attacks restrictions imposed by a dominant
network on the freedom of its members to
compete as they wish. Payment systems
continue to evolve, and new technologies
are on the horizon. Antitrust can affect
the extent to which society will benefit
from these technologies. Antitrust enforce-
ment that has a consistently positive effect
on society’s welfare will require serious
and careful economic analysis.
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Series of Average Consumer Interest Rates
Average Interest Rate
Credit Card 48-Month Used Car Persanal
Ouarter Loans New Car Loans Loans Loans
840] 0 18.73% 13.32% 17.52% 16.16%
8402 0 18.71 13.53 17.64 16.35
8403 0 18.8] 14.08 18.10 16.75
8404 0 18.82 13.9] 18.34 16.63
8501 0 18.85 13.37 17.78 16.2]
8502 0 18.74 13.16 17,77 16.09
8503 0 18.62 12.72 17.31 15.84
8504 0 18.57 12.39 17.22 15.6]
8601 0 18.48 12.29 16.63 15.52
8602 0 18.32 11.45 16.06 14.89
8603 0 18.15 11.00 15.23 14.70
8604 0 18.09 10.58 15,12 14.19
870] 0 18.10 10.35 l4AO 14.10
8702 0 17.92 10.23 14.47 14.00
8703 0 17.85 10.37 14.58 14.22
8704 0 17.82 10.86 14.97 14.58
880] 0 17.80 10.72 14.77 14.46
8802 0 17.78 10.55 14.83 14.40
8803 0 17.79 10.93 15.46 14.8]
8804 0 17.77 11.22 15.80 15.06
890] 0 17.83 11.76 16,12 15.22
8902 0 18.11 12.44 16.45 15.65
8903 0 18.07 12.13 16.22 15.45
8904 0 18.07 11.94 16.10 15.42
900] 0 18.12 11.80 15.97 15.27
9002 1 18.14 11.82 16.00 15.4]
9003 1 18.18 11.89 16.03 15.46




Year! Post-AT&T Entry Credit Card
Average Interest Rate
48-Month Used Car Personal
Quarter Loans New Car Loans Loans Loans
9004 1 18.23 11.62 16.04 15.69
9101 1 18.28 11.60 15.82 15.42
9102 1 18.22 11.28 15.74 15.16
9103 I 18.24 11.06 15.60 15.24
9104 I 18.19 10.61 14.90 14.88
920] I 18.09 9.89 14.19 14.39
9202 1 17.97 9.52 13.89 14.28
9203 1 17.66 9.15 13.44 13.94
9204 1 17.38 8.60 13.66 13.55
9301 1 17.26 8.57 13.21 13.57
9302 1 17.15 8.17 12.55 13.63
9303 1 16.59 7.98 12.52 13.45
9304 1 16.30 7.63 12.33 13.22
9401 I 16.06 7.54 12.68 12.89
9402 I 16.15 7.76 13.78 12.96
Source: Board of Governors oF the Federal Reserve System.
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